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ARTICLES
The Dissent of Theology: A Legal Analysis
of the Curran Case
By MICHAEL SCOTT FEELEY*
Introduction
Curran v. Catholic University of America I marks a new challenge for
the Roman Catholic Church (the "Church") in the American legal sys-
tem. In this case, Charles Curran, a Roman Catholic priest, is suing a
Catholic institution in civil court over a question of ecclesiastical author-
ity. Curran is unusual since, as a rule, the clergy balk at seeking resolu-
tion of intrachurch disputes in civil tribunals, where such actions bring
scandal to the faith and subject the Church to the judgment of outsiders.
Similarly, the judiciary is cautious of becoming involved in church dis-
putes in light of the first amendment prohibition against establishment of
religion and interference with the free exercise of religion.2 Therefore,
disputes between Catholic clergy and religious superiors rarely come
before a secular tribunal.3 The Curran case is indicative of a raging na-
tional debate about the purpose of Catholic universities, the principles of
* A.B., Dartmouth College, 1983; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1987. The author is cur-
rently pursuing a graduate degree in Ecclesiastical History at Oxford University.
1. Curran v. Catholic University of America, No. 1562-87 (D.C. Super. Ct., filed Feb.
27, 1987).
2. The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Even before the First Amendment became applicable to the States, courts respected the prag-
matic concern of avoiding entanglement in an area where judges had little competence and
where prudent policy counseled against meddling in sensitive "family" relations. See Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871). For a full discussion of Watson, see intfra notes
22-32 and accompanying text.
3. Courts examine disputes between a priest and his religious superior only when the
issue involves cognizable civil or property rights and not ecclesiastical relations. While a priest
or minister "can always insist that his civil or property rights as an individual or citizen shall
be determined according to the law of the land, his relations, rights and obligations arising
from his position as a member of some religious body may be determined according to the laws
enacted by that body for such purpose." Baxter v. McDonnell, 155 N.Y. 83, 87, 102, 49 N.E.
667, 671 (1898). See also Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
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academic freedom, and the role of the hierarchy in higher education.4
In his suit, Curran asks the court whether the Archbishop-Chancel-
lor of the Catholic University of America rightfully may prevent him
from teaching moral theology5 at the school. But Curran concerns the
much larger issue of what role the judiciary will play in either enforcing
or circumventing decisions of the Roman Catholic hierarchy affecting a
priest's ability to teach in a Church institution. Whether this question is
one of civil contract or free exercise of religion is unclear. The dual sta-
tus of each of the parties complicates the situation. The University is
both a Roman Catholic school and a civilly recognized nonprofit corpo-
ration. Curran is both a priest of the Roman Catholic Church and a
tenured professor contractually employed by a university.
Curran's claim is narrowly drawn. He contends that the University
breached his employment contract in two instances: (1) when the Chan-
cellor suspended him from teaching before the withdrawal of his canoni-
cal mission to teach; and (2) when the president subsequently cancelled
his scheduled classes. The parties have openly acknowledged that the
true controversy concerns the role of the Church hierarchy in supervis-
ing who teaches and what is taught in Catholic institutes of higher
learning.6
The court must decide how to frame the issue and what method of
judicial analysis to apply. In three sections, this Article suggests the
probable analysis the court will take. Section I presents a brief summary
of the controversy and the complaint Curran filed in the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia. Section II reviews the relevant case author-
ity, exposing judicial confusion as to which of two lines of case law
should be applied to resolve intrachurch disputes. This section also pro-
poses a theory of reconciling the two doctrines based on the structure of
the church involved in the suit. Section III predicts the court's analysis
priest's complaint that he did not receive due process in proceedings established by church
authorities was not cognizable in civil court).
4. The debate is exemplified by the controversy concerning the regulations of Catholic
universities proposed by the Congregation for Catholic Education. See Proposed Schema for a
Pontifical Document on Catholic Universities, reprinted in 15 ORIGINS 706 (1986). For exam-
ples of the debate, see Ass'n of Catholic Colleges and Universities, Synthesis of Responses from
Catholic College and University Presidents, reprinted in 15 ORIGINS 697 (1986) (opposing the
schema); Address by Monsignor George Kelly, President of the Fellowship of Catholic Schol-
ars, Catholic University of America (Mar. 15, 1986), reprinted in 15 ORIGINS 704 (1986) (sup-
porting the schema).
5. Moral theology is the academic discipline of ethics.
6. Address by Charles Curran, "Public Dissent in the Church," The Catholic Theology
Society (May 1986), reprinted in 16 ORIGINS 178 (1986); Letter from Joseph Cardinal Ratz-
inger to Curran (Sept. 17, 1985), reprinted in C. CURRAN, FAITHFUL DISSENT 248 (1986).
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of the issues in Curran. The Article concludes that the University will
prevail.
I. The Curran Dispute
Charles Curran is a priest of the Diocese of Rochester, New York,
and a tenured professor in the department of theology at the Catholic
University of America, in the District of Columbia.7 In 1986, the Sacred
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the body responsible for
maintaining doctrinal orthodoxy throughout the Church, declared Fa-
ther Charles Curran no longer "suitable nor eligible to exercise the func-
tion of a Professor of Catholic Theology" because of his dissent from
various church teachings on ethics and on the concept of dissent from the
Magisterium. Pope John Paul II approved the Congregation's declara-
tion,9 and the Chancellor of the University, Archbishop James Hickey of
Washington, initiated procedures established in the University's Faculty
Handbook, as amended in 1981,10 to withdraw Curran's canonical mis-
7. C. CURRAN, supra note 6, at 41.
8. Id. at 270. The Magisterium is the teaching function and office of the Roman Catho-
lic Church.
Curran has been the center of controversy since his first days at the University. Of partic-
ular note are two attempts to oust Curran from his teaching position. First, in 1967, the
University's decision not to renew his contract to teach met with a campus-wide student and
faculty strike. In the face of these protests, the University reevaluated its position, and agreed
to retain and promote Curran to Associate Professor. Second, following the release of the
papal encyclical Humana Vitae condemning artificial contraception in 1968, Pope Paul VI,
Encyclical Letter Humana Vitae, 12:AAS 60 (1968), Curran led a well-organized, public cam-
paign against the pronouncement. Although the Board of Trustees initially planned to claim
that such activity breached the employment contract, the University chose not to press the
point. C. CURRAN, supra note 6, at 15-20.
9. Letter from Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger to Curran (July 25, 1986), reprinted in C.
CURRAN, supra note 6, at 270.
10. CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY FACULTY HANDBOOK (1980) [hereinafter FACULTY HAND-
BOOK]. The Faculty Handbook contains the Bylaws governing the University, Bylaws of the
Catholic University of America (1980), FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra, pt. I, § 6 [hereinafter
University Bylaws], and Canonical Statutes governing the pontifical schools of the University,
Canonical Statutes of the Ecclesiastical Faculties of the Catholic University of America (Dec. 21,
1981, revised Dec. 23, 1984) [hereinafter Canonical Statutes].
The Canonical Statutes specifically enumerate which Church documents bind the Univer-
sity's faculty. Two particularly relevant documents are Sapientia Christiana, which is the cur-
rent Apostolic Constitution on ecclesiastical universities, Pope John Paul II, Sapientia
Christiana, Apostolic Constitution on Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties (Apr. 15, 1979)
[hereinafter Sapientia Christiana], and the Ordinationes (Apr. 29, 1979). The Faculty is also
bound by the Codex luris Canonici, or Code of Canon Law, which is the official law of the
Latin rite of the Roman Catholic Church. Canonical Statutes, supra, pt. I, § I, para. 7. Part I,
§ I, para. 8 of the Canonical Statutes states: "Norms affecting ecclesiastical faculties which are
found in the ecclesiastical legislation of the Second Vatican Council or the Apostolic See are
not repeated in these statutes." The Canonical Statutes "constitute a special chapter of the
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sion to teach."' Hickey suspended Curran from teaching in the depart-
Faculty Handbook and, when approved by the Board of Trustees, have the same force of law as
do the Bylaws of the University." Canonical Statutes, supra, pt. I, § I, para. 10.
11. In 1931, Pope Pius XI promulgated Deus Scientiarum Dominus which required each
teacher of religious subjects to have a canonical mission (missio canonica) from the competent
ecclesiastical authority. Sapientia Christiana replaced Deus Scientiarum Dominus in 1979, but
reaffirmed the canonical mission. Article 27.1 of Sapientia Christiana states:
Those who teach disciplines concerning faith or morals must receive, after making
their profession of faith, a canonical mission from the Chancellor or his delegate, for
they do not teach on their own authority but by virtue of the mission they have
received from the Church. The other teachers must receive permission to teach from
the Chancellor or his delegate.
This requirement of the apostolic constitution was codified as a law of the Church in a
new canon added to the 1983 Codex luris Canonici promulgated by Pope John II. The term
canonical mission has been replaced by mandate (mandatum). Canon 812 reads: "Those who
teach theological disciplines in any institute of higher learning must have a mandate from the
competent ecclesiastical authority." Canon 812 has met with strong opposition in the United
States due to its breadth and potential impact on Catholic higher learning. See generally Orsy,
The Mandate to Teach Theological Disciplines: Glosses on Canon 812 of the New Code, in THE-
OLOGICAL STUDIES 44 (1983); Strynkowsky, Theological Pluralism and Canonical Mandate, in
THE JURIST 42, 524-33 (1982). For detailed criticism, see Ass'n of Catholic Colleges and
Universities, Confidential Report, The Canons on Catholic Higher Education, (Aug. 1983)
(draft for discussion). For a full historical treatment of the missio, see R. Wehage, The Canon-
ical Mission for Teaching: Article 27 of the Apostolic Constitution Sapientia Christiana
(1983) (unpublished dissertation on file at Catholic University of America). For a brief histori-
cal summary, see Daly, The Needed Mandate To Teach, in FORTY-SIXTH PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CANON LAW SOCIETY OF AMERICA 114 (1984).
The Canonical Statutes include procedures for granting the canonical mission or permis-,
sion to teach when a faculty member is initially appointed a member of an ecclesiastical
faculty. Part I, section V, para. 3 states:
Upon the completion of procedures for the initial appointment of a member of an
Ecclesiastical Faculty, the President of the University forwards to the Chancellor the
application and dossier, including all relevant information and expressions of opinion
regarding the appropriateness of the candidate's appointment, for the conferral of the
canonical mission, in the case of those who teach disciplines pertaining to faith or
morals, or for permission to teach, in the case of those who are not Catholics or who
teach other disciplines.
(citations omitted). Part I, section V, para. 4 states:
The Chancellor grants the canonical mission to teach in the name of the Church or
the permission to teach. The Chancellor will not deny the canonical mission or per-
mission to teach without prior consultation with the members of the Board of Trust-
ees who are also members of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, the
President of the University, and the cognizant Committee(s) on Appointments and
Promotions. The obligation of confidentiality is to be respected by all parties."
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The Canonical Statutes also enumerate the procedure for withdrawal of the canonical
mission. Part I, section V, para. 8.1 states: "After the grant of the canonical mission or per-
mission to teach, the Chancellor may withdraw the mission or permission only for the most
serious reasons and after providing information regarding specific charges and proofs." Part I,
section V, para. 8.2 states: "If requested by the member of the Faculty, the procedures of due
process shall be employed. The procedures are for dismissal for cause initiated by the Presi-
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ment pending the outcome of the proceedings; 12 subsequently the
University President, Father Willian Byron, S.J., cancelled Curran's
scheduled classes for the 1987 spring semester.
13
Curran vigorously protested his suspension and the cancellation of
his courses, charging in his February 1987 complaint that both actions
breached his employment contract with the University.14 Since his
courses count toward credit in both the ecclesiastical degree program and
the civil degree program offered by the theology department,'" Curran
dent, which are applicable mutatis mutandis to withdrawal of the canonical mission when
initiated by the Chancellor." (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The procedures for dismissal are set forth in the Faculty Handbook and provide for a
detailed process by which an Ad Hoc committee conducts hearings and reports to the Presi-
dent. The final decision rests with the Board of Trustees who must give careful consideration
to the committee's recommendation, which includes remanding the matter to the committee if
the Board does not agree with the committee's decision. The Board must reserve final judg-
ment until after studying the committee's reconsideration. FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note
10, pt. II, § 4, art. 24.
12. Letter from Hickey to Curran (Jan. 9, 1987), reprinted in 16 ORIGINS 573 (1987).
Hickey wrote: "Those canonical statutes, which contemplate the withdrawal of the canonical
mission for 'most serious reasons,' also provides expressly for suspension in 'more serious or
pressing cases.' In my judgment, and in the judgment of the episcopal members of the board,
this is such a case." (citations omitted).
Part I, section V, para. 9.1 of the Canonical Statutes states: "For more serious or pressing
cases, the Chancellor, with the concurrence of a majority of the episcopal members of the
Board, may suspend the member of the Faculty from teaching in an Ecclesiastical Faculty
during the period of investigation." Part I, section V, para. 8.1 of the Statutes, governing
withdrawal of canonical missions, is set forth supra note 11.
13. See Letter from Curran to Hickey (Jan. 14, 1987), reprinted in 16 ORIGINs 591 (1987).
The three scheduled courses were "Social and Political Ethics," "Moral Theology in Practice,"
and "The Bible and Moral Theology."
14. Plaintiff's Complaint, Curran v. Catholic University of America, No. 1562-87 (D.C.
Super. Ct., filed Feb. 27, 1987) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Complaint]. Curran charges that the
University breached his contractually guaranteed rights to generally accepted standards of due
process as specified in the old and current Faculty Handbook section on suspension. Id. at 16.
The complaint alleges the University breached guarantees of tenure, repose, security, and
peace of mind in his employment contract with the University. As a second cause of action,
Curran argues that because he relied on written and oral representations regarding the suspen-
sion process made to him by the University, the University is estopped from taking action
adverse to his employment status. Curran also contends the University breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by disregarding the procedures it promulgated for
suspension of a tenured faculty member, violating his contractual rights to repose, security,
and peace of mind, intentionally preventing him from enjoying his contractually bargained for
employment benefits, and discriminating against him because of his views, beliefs and exercise
of academic freedom. Id. at 18-20.
15. Id. at 6. The non-canonical degree programs or civil degrees within the Theology
Department are the Master of Arts, Master of Divinity, Doctor of Ministry, and Doctor of
Philosophy. These civil degrees are granted by the power given to the University by the Dis-
trict of Columbia and regulated by national accreditation associations. Id. at 7. Curran argues
that only the pontifical degrees, those awarded by power of the Vatican and carrying canonical
effect, come under the authority of the Canonical Statutes. Id. at 8.
Fall 1987]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
contends that the Chancellor holds authority only over the faculty teach-
ing in the ecclesiastical degree program and has no power to suspend him
from teaching within the civil course of studies. 6 The Chancellor dis-
agrees, arguing that although there are two degree programs, there is
only one faculty to teach in both. 7 The dispute centers on the interpre-
tation of the rules and procedures set forth in the official University doc-
uments which are permeated with religious terms and references to
Vatican documents. Although the University has not explicitly invoked
the Free Exercise Clause, a judicial resolution of the dispute will require
pitting the University's right to religious self-determination against Cur-
ran's right to full court review of his contract claim.
The Superior Court has twice granted the University's requests for
continuance. The University has yet to file an answer to the complaint
and, by mutual consent, the parties have suspended further litigation in
order to pursue a private resolution. During the current 1987-1988 aca-
demic year, Curran is teaching at Cornell University as a visiting profes-
sor of Catholic studies.18
II. The Jurisprudence of Intrachurch Disputes
By couching the complaint in contract terms, Curran seeks to have
the court rely on civil law rather than face the deference courts generally
accord religious disputes. While the court might accept characterization
of the dispute solely in secular contract terms, an inquiry into the issues
reveals the possibility of religious questions. Therefore, any analysis of
Curran triggers the long line of judicial decisions concerning intrachurch
disputes.
A. The Hierarchical/Congregational Distinction
Most of the cases in this area involve disputes within churches over
real property, but the legal doctrines they set forth provide a framework
for judicial analysis of other types of intrachurch disputes. The Supreme
16. Curran argues that for Hickey to invoke Canon 812 to suspend Curran from the civil
degree program contradicts Curran's employment contract. Id. at 9-10. See supra note I I for
a discussion of Canon 812. Since Canon 812 was promulgated by the Roman Catholic Church
in 1983, Curran asserts that it is not included in either his contract or the Faculty Handbook.
Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 14, at 8, 13-16. Finally, Curran alleges that Hickey's ecclesi-
astical power as Archbishop of Washington does not transfer to his civil position as Chancellor
of the Catholic University. Therefore, Curran charges that the Chancellor has acted ultra vires
in suspending Curran from teaching in civilly recognized degree programs. Id. at 8, 13-16.
17. Letter from Hickey to Curran (Jan. 13, 1987), reprinted in 16 ORMGINS 591 (1987).
See infra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
18. Curran "Teaching Moment" to Play in Washington and Ithaca, Associated Press, May
1, 1987, PM cycle.
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Court, based on the type of ecclesiastical structure of the church in-
volved, has developed two different approaches to intrachurch property
conflicts. The Court applies neutral principles of law to resolve conflicts
within a congregational church-one that "by the nature of its organiza-
tion is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so far
as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any
higher authority."1 9 In contrast, when the church is hierarchical, that is,
it "is but a subordinate member of some general church organization in
which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ulti-
mate power of control more or less complete in some supreme judicatory
over the whole membership of that general organization,"20 courts ob-
serve strict deference to the decision of the church judicatory. In some
cases, however, the Supreme Court has allowed neutral principles analy-
sis in conflicts within churches that are classified as hierarchical.2 This
Article suggests that the hierarchical category actually encompasses
churches with two distinct types of ecclesiastical structures-semi-
hierarchical and fully hierarchical-and that this distinction accounts for
the different approaches employed by the Court.
The Supreme Court first explored intrachurch disputes in Watson v.
Jones.22 Since Watson predated the development of federal court re-
straints in diversity actions23 and the application of protections under the
Bill of Rights to the states,24 the decision rests solely on general federal
common law and does not depend on first amendment considerations. In
Watson, a minority of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church separated
from the majority and claimed title to the local church property. The
minority alleged it constituted the "true church," since it adhered to the
doctrines adopted by the church at the congregation's founding. The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that by establishing a separate hierar-
chy, the minority had withdrawn from the church and abandoned any
19. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 734 (1871).
20. Id.
21. See infra notes 48-59, 73-83 and accompanying text.
22. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
23. In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court declared that
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 did not authorize federal courts in diversity actions to disre-
gard state common law in favor of federal common law.
24. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court first held that the Four-
teenth Amendment made the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment applicable to the
states. The Court applied the same rationale to the Establishment Clause in Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
25. For a full discussion of the facts of Watson, see Comment, Judicial Intervention in
Disputes over Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1142 (1962). For an early treatment of the
problem of schism and donor's intent, see Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488 (1820).
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property rights.2 6
The Court distinguished between congregational 27 and hierarchi-
cal28 religious bodies. While disputes within congregational churches are
to "be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary as-
sociations,"29 Watson requires that civil courts defer to the decisions of
church superiors in a hierarchical church on matters of faith, doctrine,
internal organization, custom and law." Watson also imposed an abso-
lute prohibition against examining the religious opinions of church mem-
bers."' Concluding that the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church was
hierarchical, the Court deferred to the decision of the General Assembly
of the national church which supported the church majority. 2
In 1872, the Supreme Court affirmed the distinction between the
methods of judicial analysis applied to the different classifications of ec-
clesiastical polity. Bouldin v. Alexander3" involved a congregational
Baptist church in the District of Columbia. A minority of the congrega-
tion seized control of church property and expelled the majority. The
Court utilized ordinary principles of property law, carefully noting that
the dispute involved no religious questions.3 The Court underscored the
church's congregational status by stating that there existed no ecclesias-
tic judicatory for the church.
1. The "Strict Deference" Doctrine
Three concepts work together to form the foundation for the
Court's deference rule: contract assent, ban on doctrinal determinations,
and narrow scope of review.35 The contract assent principle presupposes
that members who have chosen to join or remain in a church have as-
sented to its system of authority and are accordingly bound by its rules
26. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 734.
27. Id. at 722.
28. Id. at 722-23.
29. Id. at 725.
30. "[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been
carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their
application to the case before them." Id. at 727.
31. Id. at 725.
32. Id. at 726-27.
33. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
34. "It is not to be overlooked that we are not now called upon to decide who were church
officers. The case involves no such question. What we have to decide is: where was the legal
ownership of the property? The question respects temporalities, and temporalities alone." Id.
at 137.
35. See Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal. Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Dis-
putes, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1378, 1387-89 (1981).
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and judgments.36 The Court has also forbidden civil tribunals from mak-
ing substantive decisions on church doctrine, since civil courts have no
competence in religious matters, 37 and because attempting such decisions
will interfere with religious rights.38 Finally, the Court has severely lim-
ited the scope of the usual judicial contract analysis to the question of
assent. In a hierarchical situation, therefore, civil courts must accept the
decision of the highest church judicatory that has spoken on the subject,
even when the dissenting party claims the church has no jurisdiction or
has violated its own procedures.39
A short-lived modification of the deference rule occurred in 1929, in
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop,4 which concerned a conflict
within the Roman Catholic Church. The Archbishop refused to appoint
the ten-year-old plaintiff to a collative chaplaincy, by which he would be
expected to celebrate masses in order to receive the income therefrom.
The Archbishop observed that Canon Law permitted only ordained
priests to hold this position. The Court supported the Archbishop, but
suggested a limited exception to Watson for judicial review of ecclesiasti-
cal decisions for fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness. 41
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the deference rule in Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral,42 the first case in which the Court was required to
resolve an internal dispute within a hierarchical church following the ap-
plication of the religion clauses to the states.4 3 A group of clergy in the
Russian Orthodox Church, acknowledging the authority of the Patriarch
of Moscow, challenged the constitutionality of an enactment of the New
York legislature44 that transferred title to their cathedral to local dissi-
dent clergy not loyal to the Moscow Patriarch. The Court held that free-
36. "All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this gov-
ernment, and are bound to submit to it." Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 726-29.
37. "It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the
ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in refer-
ence to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in the law
which should decide the case, to one which is less so." Id. at 729.
38. Id. at 728-29.
39. Id. at 733-34.
40. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
41. Id. at 16. The arbitrariness suggested by Justice Brandeis has been disavowed by the
Court. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 715 (1976); see also
Ellman, supra note 35, at 1389-91; Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-
Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1120 (1965).
42. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). See Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Over Religious Issues,
20 OHIO ST. L.J. 508, 516-34 (1959).
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
44. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 150.
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dom to select clergy enjoyed first amendment protection. 45 By passing
control of the cathedral from one group of priests to another, the New
York legislature had violated free exercise of religion.46 Kedroff reaf-
firmed the doctrine of strict deference to a church's determinations; how-
ever, the Court avoided the question of how to determine the controlling
church authority by assuming it to be the Patriarch of Moscow.47
2. Expanding Application of the Neutral Principles Doctrine
In 1969, the Court took two major steps with regard to intrachurch
dispute doctrines in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church ("Blue Hull Church").48 First, the Wat-
son prohibition on judicial determination of doctrinal issues took on con-
stitutional significance. Second, the Court suggested a "neutral
principles" analysis as a possible legal alternative to strict deference.
Two local congregations of the Presbyterian Church in Georgia sought
independence from the national church on the grounds that the national
church had departed from the doctrines in force when they first affiliated
with it.49 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict awarding
control of property to the local congregations based on a state law which
provided an automatic implied trust in favor of the national church 50 so
long as the national church continued to profess the same doctrine as it
did when the local congregation joined.5 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court began its opinion by observing that the "local Presbyte-
45. "Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we
think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as part of the free exercise of
religion against state interference." Conditioning the right to clergy selection on proper meth-
ods is supported by reference to Gonzalez. Id. at 116.
46. Id. at 107.
47. The Court stated that the right to use the cathedral was "strictly a matter of ecclesias-
tical government, the power of the Supreme Church Authority of the Russian Orthodox
Church to appoint the ruling hierarch of the archdiocese of North America. No one disputes
that such power did lie in that Authority prior to the Russian Revolution." Id. at 115.
Upon remand, the court of appeals found in favor of the American Russian Orthodox
Church on the grounds that the Moscow Patriarch was so under the secular domination of the
Soviet Union that his appointee would not be recognized in New York. St. Nicholas
Cathederal v. Kreshik, 7 N.Y. 2d 191, 164 N.E. 2d 687, 196 N.Y.S. 2d 655 (1959). On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court reversed and, citing Kendroff, made clear its adherence to the
principle of strict deference. Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (per
curiam).
48. 393 U.S. 440 (1969). For discussions of the case, see Kauper, Church Autonomy and
the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 347, and Sampen,
Civil Courts, Church Property and Neutral Principles: A Dissenting View, 1975 ILL. L.F. 543.
49. Blue Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 440.
50. Id. at 443-44. For a treatment of the historical development of the English implied
trust theory from which the Georgia law derives, see Comment, supra note 25, at 1147-49.
51. The Georgia test has two parts:
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nan churches [are] governed by a hierarchical structure of tribunals." 2
The Supreme Court declared the state law in violation of the First
Amendment because it required a civil court to "determine matters at
the very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church doc-
trines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion." 3 While
firmly banning judicial inquiry into religious doctrine, the opinion sug-
gests the possibility of allowing civil courts to apply neutral principles to
resolve property disputes within a hierarchical church without implicat-
ing free exercise rights 4.5  On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court at-
tempted a neutral principles analysis by examining church deeds, and
again awarded title to the local congregations." The United States
Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.56
One year later, in Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of
God v. Church of God, Inc., the Court approved the neutral principles
approach in a dispute involving a hierarchical church. The Court held
that the Maryland Court of Appeals, in adjudicating a property dispute
between the national church and two seceding congregations, correctly
applied a neutral principles analysis. 8 Since the judicial inquiry did not
concern doctrinal questions, the appeal involved no substantial federal
question and was dismissed. 9
In his important concurrence in Virginia Eldership, Justice Brennan
described three possible approaches to the settlement of intrachurch dis-
The civil court must first decide whether the challenged actions of the general
church depart substantially from prior doctrine. In reaching such a decision, the
court must of necessity make its own interpretation of the meaning of church doc-
trines. If the court should decide that a substantial departure has occurred, it must
then go on to determine whether the issue on which the general church has departed
holds a place of such importance in the traditional theology as to require that the
trust be terminated.
393 U.S. at 450.
52. Id. at 441-42.
53. Id.
54. "Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to
disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use
in all property disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing' churches to which prop-
erty is awarded." Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
55. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 261, 167
S.E.2d 658, 660 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970).
56. 396 U.S. 1041 (1970) (denial of certiorari).
57. 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam).
58. The lower court "relied upon provisions of state statutory law governing the holding
of property by religious corporations, upon language in the deeds conveying the properties in
question to the local church corporations, upon the terms of the charters of the corporations,
and upon provisions in the constitution of the General Eldership pertinent to the ownership
and control of church property." Id. at 367 (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 368.
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putes.6 ° First, the State may adopt the strict deference rule of Watson
and determine only the church authority to which the court must defer.6'
Second, courts may use the neutral principles approach to "determine
ownership by studying deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corpora-
tion laws.",62 Third, the State could pass laws governing church property
arrangements so long as the statutes did not interfere with religious doc-
trines or take control of church polity from ecclesiastical governing
authorities.63
Speaking for the Court in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Miivojevich,64 however, Justice Brennan staunchly affirmed the first ap-
proach of strict deference, 65 and the Blue Hull Church ban on doctrinal
inquiry.66 The Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court's de-
termination that the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox
Church had both improperly removed the plaintiff as head of the Ameri-
can-Canadian diocese and invalidly divided the diocese into three new
dioceses. The Court refused to examine whether the Holy Assembly's
actions violated procedures set forth in the constitution and penal code of
the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Court acknowledged that Gonzalez
had raised the possibility of "marginal civil court review" in challenges
of "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness," but foreclosed any civil court in-
quiry into arbitrariness when reviewing decisions of church tribunals.67
60. Brennan noted that "a state may adopt any one of various approaches for settling
church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether
the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
61. Id. at 368-69.
62. Id. at 370.
63. Id.
64. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). Serbian is reminiscent of Kedroff in that an anti-communist
atmosphere surrounds the two cases. See Note, The Role of Civil Courts in Church Disputes,
1977 Wis. L. REV. 904, 921 n.95.
65. The fallacy fatal to the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is that it rests
upon an impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals
of this hierarchical church upon the issues in dispute, and impermissibly substitutes
its own inquiry into church polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes.
426 U.S. at 708.
66. For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by
civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments man-
date that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribu-
nal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding
on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them.
Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 712, 713.
We have concluded that whether or not there is room for "marginal civil court re-
view" under the narrow rubrics of "fraud" and "collusion" when church tribunals
act in bad faith for secular purposes, no "arbitrariness" exception-in the sense of an
inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical
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Such an inquiry, concluded the Court, would necessarily draw the judici-
ary deeply into doctrinal matters. In its examination of alleged arbitrari-
ness, the Illinois trial court had actually engaged in detailed review of
evidence concerning removal proceedings68 and had evaluated the dio-
cese's reorganization. The Supreme Court sharply disapproved of both
inquiries.69
Serbian suggests that courts may undertake only a minimal inquiry
for purposes of identifying the highest church authority,7 ° and may en-
force document provisions only when they are "so express" as to involve
no searching inquiry into church polity.71 However, judicial determina-
tion of what constitutes controlling church documents and what these
documents mean easily can involve religious questions. The mere identifi-
cation of relevant ecclesiastical authority becomes, therefore, a religious
inquiry as well. In Serbian, the Court assumed that the Holy Assembly
was the church body to which deference was due, but it did not explain
how it decided this crucial point without violating Blue Hull Church.7
2
Three years after Serbian, the Court revitalized the neutral princi-
church complied with church laws and regulations-is consistent with the constitu-
tional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest
judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline,
faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. For civil courts to
analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are in that sense
"arbitrary" must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesi-
astical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else into the sub-
stantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question.
But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits.
Id. at 713.
The majority opinion in Serbian elaborated on the inappropriateness of arbitrariness anal-
ysis in review of chuch decisions due to the fundamentally different nature and rationale of
religious judgments:
Indeed, it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and
are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objec-
tive criteria. Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of
"fundamental fairness" or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to
such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.
Id. at 714-15.
For a discussion of the elimination of the arbitrariness exception, see Note, Serbian East-
ern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich: The Continuing Crusade for Separation of Church and
State, 18 WM. AND MARY L. REv. 655, 669-74 (1977).
68. 426 U.S. at 718-20.
69. Id. at 720, 721. The Court scathingly attacked the lower court's evaluation of witness
testimony, interpretation of constitutional and penal provisions, and selective use of the docu-
ments and events. It is ironic that the Court engaged in an in-depth review of the documents
to demonstrate the lower court's errors.
70. Id. at 709.
71. "The constitutional provisions of the American-Canadian Diocese were not so express
that the civil courts could enforce them without engaging in a searching and, therefore, imper-
missible inquiry into church polity." Id. at 723.
72. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argued:
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ples approach in Jones v. Wolf.73 However, the strong dissent of four
justices committed to strict deference74 has left its precise meaning and
significance in doubt.75 In Wolf, a Georgia trial court employed the neu-
tral principles approach to resolve a dispute between two church factions
of a Presbyterian congregation over title to local properties.76 The
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision for clarification as to
whether a majoritarian presumption existed under Georgia law and
whether the identity of local congregations is a matter for the national
church to determine.77
Here the underlying question addressed by the Illinois courts is the one assumed
in Watson et al.: whether the members of the American-Canadian Diocese had
bound themselves to abide by the decisions of the Mother Church in the matters at
issue here. The Illinois courts concluded that in regard to some of these matters,
they had agreed to be bound only if certain procedures were followed and that as to
others there had been no agreement to submit to the authority of the Belgrade Patri-
archate at all.
Id. at 732 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Rehnquist further observed that the lower court did not impose its doctrinal preference,
but, at the request of the disputants, determined whether both parties had followed mutually
agreed-upon canon law. Id. at 726-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Essentially, Rehnquist sup-
ported a conflict of laws analysis and accepted Brandeis' characterization of church groups in
Gonzales as no different from other voluntary associations. He argued that blind deference is
not consistent with the First Amendment and to treat religious groups differently from other
voluntary associations could create establishment clause problems. Id. at 734 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
73. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
74. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Burger, Stewart, and White, vigorously denounced
the neutral principles approach as inconsistent with the First Amendment. The dissenters
supported strict deference to the decision of the church authority to whom control was ac-
corded before the schism. Id. at 610-12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. For a complete discussion of the opinion, see Adams & Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf:
Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1291
(1980); Note, Church Property Dispute Resolution: An Expanded Role for Courts After Jones v.
Wolf?, 68 GEO. L.J. 1141 (1980); Comment, Church Property Disputes: The Trend and the
Alternative, 31 MERCER L. REV. 559 (1980); Comment, Jones v. Wolf: Church Property Dis-
putes and Judicial Intrusion into Church Governance, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 538 (1981).
76. Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 243 S.E.2d 860 (1978), vacated and remanded, 443 U.S.
595 (1979). The majority of the local congregations sought to change its affiliation from one
national church, Presbyterian Church of the United States ("PCUS"), to another, Presbyterian
Church of America ("PCA"). PCUS, at the request of a minority of the congregation opposed
to change, determined that the minority was the true church and held title to local properties.
77. 443 U.S. at 607-08. The court did not quarrel with the legal presumption that major-
ity rule controls so long as Georgia in fact had such a presumption. A majority readily can be
identified without impermissible religious inquiry, and the presumption is rebuttable by any
means which will not impair free exercise of religion or entangle the courts in doctrinal dis-
putes. Id. On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court found that the State had indeed adopted a
majoritarian presumption and that a neutral principles analysis revealed nothing to rebut the
presumption. Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388, 390, 260 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1979). For a critical discus-
sion of the decision, see Comment, Church Property Disputes: The Trend and the Alternative,
supra note 75, at 578-80.
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Reaffirming Blue Hull Church, the Court held that "a State is con-
stitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles of law as a means of ad-
judicating a church property dispute. ' 7  The Court also noted that this
approach was consistent with the ban on doctrinal inquiries and was an
efficient means of resolving intrachurch property disputes.79 The deci-
sion cautioned courts against attempting to interpret church documents
when to do so might require reliance on religious precepts or incorpora-
tion of religious concepts.8" Under Wolf, courts are bound to give legal
effect to the language of church documents, "provided it is embodied in
some legally cognizable form."8"
The caveat as to "legally cognizable form" raises problems in judi-
cial interpretation of church documents.8 2 One problem concerns the
determination of what constitutes religious language. It is virtually im-
possible to devise wording which could not be seen as entailing questions
of doctrine, polity, faith, church law, or religious custom. 3
78. 443 U.S. at 604.
79. The primary advantages of the neutral principles approach are that it is com-
pletely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of
religious organization and polity. The method relies exclusively on objective, well-
established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It
thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of
religious doctrine, polity, and practice. Furthermore, the neutral-principles analysis
shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems in general-flexibility in ordering
private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.
Id. at 603.
80. Id. at 604.
81. Id. at 605.
82. As the dissent pointed out:
One effect of the Court's evidentiary rule is to deny to the courts relevant evi-
dence as to religious polity-that is, the form of governance-adopted by [the
Church's] members. The constitutional documents of churches tend to be drawn in
terms of religious precepts. Attempting to read them 'in pure secular terms' is more
likely to promote confusion than understanding. Moreover, whenever religious polity
has not been expressed in specific statements referring to the property of a church,
there will be no evidence of that polity cognizable under the neutral-principles rule.
Lacking such evidence, presumably a court will impose some rule of church govern-
ment derived from state law.
Id. at 612-13 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
83. To illustrate the problem, Professor Mansfield poses a hypothetical case of a donor's
attempt to contribute funds to the Roman Catholic Church in Chicago:
He must be careful in making his gift not to use the words 'Roman Catholic.'
These are words of religious significance and would clearly be intended by him as
such. A dispute may well arise as to which of two groups is the Roman Catholics in
Chicago. The donor must not give his property to 'the Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Chicago, a corporation sole.' That there is such a corporate entity can be known
without addressing religious questions, but determination of the identity of the per-
son who embodies that entity and is entitled to control its assets does involve a reli-
gious question and is potentially subject to dispute. Kedroff and Milivojevich show
that disputes about matters of this sort are not imaginary. Nor will it do any good to
give money to 'the person determined by the Pope to be the Roman Catholic Arch-
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Over the course of more than a century, the Supreme Court has
developed a framework for civil court resolution of intrachurch disputes.
Although many questions remain, the Court has consistently endorsed as
fundamental the Watson principles of voluntary contract in joining a reli-
gious body, the ban on doctrinal inquiry, and strict deference in hierar-
chical church disputes. The interpretation and application of these
principles, however, is in a state of flux. The direction of the Court, espe-
cially in light of changes in its composition since Wolf, is uncertain.8 4
3. Extending the Doctrine to Contract Disputes
The Curran case concerns the applicability of the principles estab-
lished for intrachurch real property fights to a contract dispute.
Although the Court has not yet ruled directly on the issue, some state
courts have done so. For example, in 1976, in Putman v. Vath,85 the
Supreme Court of Alabama considered the suit of a Catholic priest
against his bishop. The Bishop of Birmingham suspended Putman when
he refused to accept a reassignment. At Putman's request, the bishop
began ecclesiastical appeal procedures which resulted in the Vatican's af-
firmation of the bishop's decision. 6 Putman then sought monetary dam-
ages and a declaratory judgment that the bishop could not deprive him of
"a benefice, office or salary sufficient for his proper support, and [could]
not suspend him from his priestly duties," unless he received a due pro-
bishop of Chicago,' for who is the Pope is itself a religious question under the Hull
rule. There was a time when three persons claimed to be Pope.
Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 866-67 (1984).
84. The Court recently denied certiorari in a case concerning an employment dispute be-
tween a pastor and his Baptist congregation. Little v. Baptist Church, 106 S. Ct. 1802 (1986)
(denial of certiorari). The church was self-governing and autonomous rather than hierarchi-
cal. One faction claiming to represent the church filed suit to have the pastor enjoined from
entering the church premises on the grounds that, at a duly held meeting, a majority of the
congregation had voted to terminate the pastor's employment contract. Id. at 1803. The pas-
tor denied the faction's authority to undertake this action. The trial court ordered a vote of
the congregation, and then ceritified that a majority elected to terminate the employment con-
tract. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from the denial of certiorari. The
dissent argued that:
The court in this case should have limited its inquiry to the terms of petitioner's
employment contract and to whether the Church had taken the actions requisite to
terminating the contract. If the authorized body had indeed terminated petitioner's
employment, then the court could validly have taken steps to enforce the Church's
right to keep petitioner off Church property. Until respondents, who bore the burden
of proof, demonstrated that such termination had taken place, the court's only
proper response was to do nothing.
Id. at 1804 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. 340 So.2d 26 (Ala. 1976).
86. Id. at 27.
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cess hearing before a Church tribunal.8" The Alabama Supreme Court
ruled that the dispute concerned ecclesiastical matters and thus could not
be resolved by a civil court. The opinion analogized the case to Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich 88 and reaffirmed the prohibition
against civil court adjudication of religious controversies.89
In Reardon v. Lemoyne,9° a case involving a contract dispute be-
tween four nuns who challenged the refusal of the Diocese of Manchester
to renew their teaching contracts, 91 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
expanded the neutral principles approach and rejected the Diocese's con-
tention that strict deference was required. The court stated that the nuns
had a right of access to the courts to resolve nondoctrinal questions relat-
ing to civil contracts into which they had voluntarily entered.92 The
court ruled that the suit was not prohibited by the First Amendment and
ordered the trial court to interpret the meaning of the contract provisions
according to accepted contract principles, reviewing the Diocese's dis-
missal practices and evaluating the sufficiency of any secular reasons for
the Diocese's refusal to renew.93
87. Id.
88. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
89. 340 So.2d at 30. Similarly, the Eight Circuit in Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355
(8th Cir. 1983), dismissed a priest's suit for defamation, conspiracy and deprivation of canoni-
cal due process against his bishop.
In the instant case, however, Kaufmann's claims relate to his status and employ-
ment as a priest, and possibly to other matters of concern with the church and its
hierarchy, and go to the heart of internal church discipline, faith and church organi-
zation, all involved with ecclesiastical rule, custom and law. While there may be
some secular aspects to employment and conceivably even to the priesthood or clergy, it
is apparent that the priest or other member of the clergy occupies a particularly sensi-
tive role in any church organization. Significant responsibility in matters of the faith
and direct contact with members of the church body with respect to matters of the
faith and exercise of religion characterize such positions.
Id. at 358-59 (emphasis added).
90. 122 N.H. 1042, 454 A.2d 428 (1982).
91. The employment contract incorporated the Diocesan School handbook which con-
tained an ambiguous term relating to when certain procedural safeguards would be triggered.
Note, Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes, 83 COLUM L. REv. 2007, 2017-19 (1983).
92. 122 N.H. at 1047, 454 A.2d at 431-32.
93. Id. at 1047-49, 454 A.2d at 432. The opinion warned the trial court of the "distinc-
tion between non-doctrinal matters, wherein jurisdiction lies, and matters involving doctrine,
faith, or internal organization, which are insulated from juducial inquiry." Id. at 1050, 454
A.2d at 433.
Similarly, New York's highest court held in Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446
N.E.2d 136, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983), that the First Amendment
does not forbid judicial recognition and enforcement of the secular terms of the Jewish mar-
riage agreement, the Ketubah. In order to divorce under Jewish law, the couple must appear
before a rabbinic tribunal. The wife in Avitzur asked the court to compel her husband to
appear as allegedly agreed to in the marriage agreement. The court found that the wife merely
sought to compel her husband "to perform a secular obligation to which he contractually
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Putman demonstrates a judicial wariness of reviewing disputes be-
tween priests and bishops concerning the duties or status of the former.
Reardon illustrates a judicial desire to afford all people, including those
involved in religious organizations, access to courts for the adjudication
of their claims. Reaching opposite results, these decisions exemplify the
difficulties courts encounter in applying the principles enunciated by the
Supreme Court.94 Even if its application is problematic, it is well-settled
that the First Amendment forbids civil court resolution of questions of
religious doctrine, faith, and polity as well as ecclesiastical law.95 To
comply with this precept, courts imply a contractual relationship be-
tween the individual members and the church. The court then need only
determine the proper authority and that authority's action. Strict defer-
ence is a pragmatic rule of judicial construction. In balancing the detri-
ments of not fully investigating the claims of church members against the
dangers of interfering with the self-determination of religious bodies, the
Supreme Court has chosen to risk constricting an individual's rights on
the grounds that he voluntarily enrolled and remained in the church.
Strict deference applies to all intrachurch disputes that require a de-
termination of religious questions. Only in those conflicts that do not
involve religious matters do courts have the option to apply neutral prin-
ciples of law. By carving out an exception to strict deference, the Court
has attempted to fashion a method of resolving internal church disputes
without interfering in religious issues.96 Courts may not dispense With
the laws of property and contract merely because the parties share a reli-
gious affiliation. The difficulty arises in determining if the claims, argu-
ments, and documents before the bench can be analyzed without
referring to, or requiring an examination of, res religiosae.
B. Reconciling Strict Deference and Neutral Principles Cases
In attempting to harmonize the strict deference and neutral princi-
ples analyses used for deciding religious disputes, various points must be
kept in mind. The first step in reconciling the cases is to acknowledge
that judicial framing of the legal question and facts generally is determi-
bound himself. In this regard, no doctrinal issue need be passed upon, no implementation of a
religious duty is contemplated, and no interference with religious authority will result." Id. at
115, 446 N.E.2d at 139, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 575. The dissent argued that ordering specific per-
formance of a religious obligation in which the meaning of religiously pregnant terms is dis-
puted lies beyond the competence of a civil court. Furthermore, according to the dissent, the
State had no interest in the status of the marriage since the court had granted a civil divorce in
1978. Id. at 116, 446 N.E.2d at 142, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Jones, J., dissenting).
94. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15:7
native of the analysis. The denial of certiorari to petitions following the
decisions of the Georgia court on remand in Blue Hull Church and Wolf,
and the per curiam dismissal in Virginia Eldership, bolster the view that
the Court gives wide latitude to the decisions of lower courts so long as
the latter employ the "correct" constitutional language.97 Kedroff and
Serbian suggest, however, that the Court is committed to strict defer-
ence98 and only in the most secular controversies will it countenance neu-
tral principles.99 Even when, in Serbian, the Illinois Supreme Court
couched its inquiry in the language of neutral principles, the Supreme
Court independently reevaluated the dispute, determined it involved doc-
trinal controversy, extolled strict deference, and reversed.
As an approach to reconciling the Supreme Court cases, it is neces-
sary to evaluate the nature of the churches involved. Although the
church in each case came within the Watson 1 o rubric of "hierarchical,"
in reality there are two distinct groups of hierarchical churches. The two
types can be categorized as semi-hierarchical and fully hierarchical
churches.101
Semi-hierarchical churches, although not autonomous, rely funda-
mentally on a structural connection to an ascending order of authority
outside the local church. Rather than each congregation envisioning it-
self as indispensibly part of a larger, comprehensive church that possesses
full power over it, the congregations of a semi-hierarchical church regard
themselves as members of a religious affiliation. The local church may
define itself without reference to the Mother Church. For example, a
local Presbyterian congregation could sever its affiliation with one na-
tional Presbyterian association and join another while still considering
itself Presbyterian and continuing in virtually the same manner as before
the withdrawal1 02
97. "Correct" constitutional lanquage means crafting the analysis in such a way as to
create the impression that only secular terms are being construed, thereby avoiding the appear-
ance of governmental intrusion into religious self-governance. See supra notes 48-59 and ac-
companying text.
98. See supra notes 42-47, 64-72 and accompanying text.
99. As used in text "most secular" refers to those disputes that do not involve issues of
polity, doctrine, faith, church law, or custom, in which the religious status of the parties has no
bearing on the case. This, of course, is at the discretion of the courts and arguably has led to
the variance of opinions between the Supreme Court and lower courts.
100. See supra notes 19-39 and accompanying text.
101. Virtually all churches, of course, are hierarchical to some degree, but the term is used
more strictly here to describe the degree of control one level of church government exerts over
"subordinate" people or groups in a particular religious structure.
102. The national church association from which the congregation withdrew might con-
sider the action schismatic, but the local congregation is still capable of continuing its same
essential polity, doctrine, and customs alone or with another association.
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In contrast, local congregations of fully hierarchical churches are
not self-defining. Each individual congregation views itself as a cell of
the Mother Church and its existence is defined by an ecclesiastical struc-
ture apart from which it would cease to exist. For example, a Roman
Catholic congregation would no longer remain Roman Catholic if it sev-
ered its ties to the Holy See. Even if the local congregation continued to
exist as a religious body that professed adherence to most of the tenets of
Catholic Christianity, it would not be Roman Catholic.103
Viewed from this perspective, the contradictory Supreme Court de-
cisions appear more consistent. The Court applied strict deference in
Gonzalez, involving the Roman Catholic Church,"° Kedrqff, pertaining
to the Russian Orthodox Church, 1 5 and Serbian, which concerned the
Serbian Orthodox Church.16 It permitted a neutral principles approach
in Bouldin, which concerned the Baptist Church and which is the only
congregational case,'0 7 Blue Hull Church and Wolf,' 8 both of which in-
volved the Presbyterian Church, 0 9 and Virginia Eldership, a case con-
cerning the Church of God."l0
Four possible reasons may explain why the Court acted in this man-
ner. First, the Roman Catholic,"' Russian Orthodox,' 12 and Serbian
Orthodox Churches" 3 are well-structured, international, episcopal poli-
ties with easily identifiable central administrations." 4 Second, hierarchi-
103. As another illustration, the Church of England considers itself Catholic, but not Ro-
man Catholic, since severing its union with the Pope.
104. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 48-56, 73-81 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
111. For an exposition of Roman Catholic polity, see THE TEACHING OF CHRIST: A
CATHOLIC CATECHISM FOR ADULTS 200-08 (R. Lawler, D. Wuerl & T. Lawler, eds. 1976). A
documentary presentation may be found in THE TEACHING OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AS
CONTAINED IN HER DOCUMENTS 197-252 (J. Neuner, H Roos & K. Rahner, eds. 1967).
112. For an explanation of the Russian Orthodox doctrine and ecclesiastical structure, see
G. MASTRANTONIS, A NEW STYLE CATHECHISM ON THE EASTERN ORTHODOX FAITH FOR
ADULTS 108-10 (1969) and J. ELLIS, THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH: A CONTEMPORARY
HISTORY 202-50 (1986).
113. For a description of the Serbian Orthodox Church polity, see G. MALONEY, A HIS-
TORY OF ORTHODOX THEOLOGY SINCE 1453, at 245-70 (1976) and M. PuPIN, SERBIAN OR-
THODOX CHURCH (1918).
114. Perhaps there is something more characteristically "American" about the semi-hierar-
chical churches, since they are not governed by authority outside the United States. The
Roman Catholic Church is identified with Rome, the Russian Othodox Church with Moscow,
the Serbian Orthodox Church with Belgrade. This international element may color the
Court's perspective, especially in light of the long histories and traditional understanding of
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cal authority is fundamental to these churches. "' Since the three
churches view the episcopal structure as divinely derived, any interfer-
ence with the use of such authority would constitute a severe intrusion
on religious free exercise." 6 Third, the authoritarian nature of the eccle-
siastical bodies in question is longstanding and commonly known by both
the faithful and the lay public. Fourth, these churches historically have
maintained separate, internal procedures for dealing with intrachurch
disputes." 7 Therefore, resort to civil courts is unnecessary except when
errors are alleged in the proceedings." 8 In sum, judicial examination of
internal church conflicts appears to intrude on first amendment rights of
fully hierarchical churches and thus strict deference is appropriate.
The semi-hierarchical Presbyterian Church,' Baptist Church, 20
and Church of God' 2' do not have the same style of polity as the fully
hierarchical churches. These churches do not emphasize global levels of
authority or allegiance to a particular religious office. The bonds be-
tween the local church and the national church are less tightly woven
than those in the fully hierarchical churches.122 The nature of the semi-
hierarchical structure is more like a religious affiliation than a sine qua
non of the faith.
The Court has justified applying strict deference by stressing that
the complaining parties agreed to accept the authority of the hierarchical
system by virtue of their membership in the church. While strict defer-
these churches. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text. The current unrest among
some American Roman Catholics stems in part from the American character imbued with
democratic principles, individualism, and freedom to question authority.
115. See supra notes 111-113.
116. For the divine basis of the episcopacy, see CATECHISM OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 18-
22 (E. Kevane trans. 1980). See also supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
117. Codex luris Canonici governs internal procedures for the Roman Catholic Church.
See supra note 10. For a discussion of Russian Orthodox internal organization, see THE Rus-
SIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH: ORGANIZATION, SITUATION, ACTIvITY 31-38 (1959); for Serbian
Orthodox canon law, see Constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Diocese of the United States of
America and Canada, approved by the Holy Assembly of Bishops (1928), and the Revised Penal
Code for Ecclesiastical Courts, adopted by the Holy Assembly of Bishops (1961) (copies may be
obtained at the monastery of St. Sava, Libertyville, Pennsylvania).
118. See supra note 41.
119. For a description of Presbyterian ecclesiastical structure, see H. WITHERSPOON & J.
KIRKPATRICK, A MANUAL OF CHURCH DOCTRINE (1960) and J. MACKAY, THE PRESBYTE-
RIAN WAY OF LIFE 68-71 (1965). See also supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
120. For a presentation of Presbyterian ecclesiastical structure, see H. WITHERSPOON & J.
KIRKPATRICK, A SHORT BAPTIST MANUAL OF POLITY AND PRACTICE (1965) and D.
GAINES, BELIEFS OF BAPTISTS 68-71 (1952).
121. For information on the structure of the Church of God, see F. MEAD, HANDBOOK OF
DENOMINATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 21, 83-86 (1985). See also supra notes 57-59 and
accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
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ence seems constitutionally mandated in a fully hierarchical church, the
Court has the option of applying strict deference or neutral principles to
semi-hierarchical churches because they are midway between a congrega-
tional polity and a fully hierarchical polity. In a balance of the right of
access to the civil justice system against the right of religious self-deter-
mination, a semi-hierarchical church tips the scales differently than does
a fully hierarchical church. Since the four reasons previously mentioned
are not clearly applicable to semi-hierarchical churches, adopting a judi-
cial rule granting total power to the highest authority in a semi-hierarchi-
cal polity is less justifiable than doing so in the case of an ancient,
episcopal system connected to a central administration in a foreign
country.
The Court bases its strict deference rule on the consensual nature of
the association, which by definition includes acceptance of the institu-
tional structure of authority. The rule states that if A acknowledges that
B has any control over A, the Court will regard B as having complete
authority over A. 23 Fully hierarchical churches have a more persuasive
case for such a rule; the court may be more aware that it is applying a
fictive rule in actions involving semi-hierarchical churches in which ques-
tions of authority and scope of power cannot be passed over so easily. In
consequence, a court may prefer to proceed with the neutral principles
approach rather than countenance strict deference.
Perhaps this distinction only masks a glorified method of determin-
ing the proper church authority to whom deference is due. The depth of
the relationship between a local church and the larger church may be
difficult for the courts to discern in semi-hierarchical churches. The
courts may therefore engage in a neutral principles analysis to avoid hav-
ing to decide if the larger church actually has authority over the local
church. The semi-hierarchical/fully hierarchical distinction, however,
may help explain previous Supreme Court decisions in the area of in-
trachurch disputes.
III. The Curran Case
The issue in Curran is precise: did Curran's suspension from teach-
ing and the subsequent cancellation of his classes constitute a breach of
his employment contract with Catholic University? This section argues
that in spite of-or perhaps because of-the complexity of the issues, the
123. The author is indebted to Professor John Mansfield of the Harvard Law School for
this insight.
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court will most likely apply a strict deference approach and rule in favor
of the University.
A. Characterizing the Parties and the Dispute
1. The Parties
In order to decide the threshold question of whether this is in fact an
intrachurch dispute, the court must first characterize the parties and
their relationship to each other. Charles Curran is both an ordained Ro-
man Catholic priest and a tenured university professor. Catholic Univer-
sity is both a Roman Catholic institution and a nonprofit corporation
subject to the laws of the District of Columbia. The dual civil-religious
character of each of the parties raises doubts as to whether the contro-
versy will be regarded as an intrachurch fight.
a. Catholic University
In the 1976 case of Granfield v. Catholic University of America, 24
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found the University
to be a sectarian institution with undeniable ties to the Roman Catholic
Church.'25 Recently, the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University,'2 6 and the
Seventh Circuit's rulings in Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago' 7 and
Maguire v. Marquette University,'"8 found the defendant universities to
have sufficient relations with the Roman Catholic Church to be consid-
ered religious employers. Because of its explicit identification with the
institutional church and because it is directly controlled by the national
hierarchy, Catholic University appears to have an even stronger claim to
sectarian status than Georgetown, Loyola, or Marquette Universities.
The University's structure, philosophy, and history afford public no-
tice to all connected with it that the University is intimately intertwined
with the Roman Catholic Church. University Bylaws require that half of
the members of the Board of Trustees be clerics.'2 9 Three-quarters of
124. 530 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
125. Id. at 1043 n.19 (upholding the University's use of a pay scale for priests lower than
that for lay faculty).
126. 496 A.2d 547, 574 n.12, vacated per curiam, 496 A.2d 587 (D.C. App. 1985).
127. 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the case, see ihfra note 193 and
accompanying text.
128. 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987). For a discussion of the case, see infra note 194 and
accompanying text.
129. University Bylaws, supra note 10, § II, para. 1. For an official history of the founding
of the University, see J. ELLIS, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF
AMERICA (1946).
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these clerics must be members of the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops. 130 The Archbishop of Washington is the Chancellor ex of-
ficio.' Clergy, seminarians, and religious sisters and brothers fre-
quently teach and study at the University. As the flagship educational
center of the American Catholic hierarchy, many priests and other
Catholics are sent to the University for preparatory and graduate studies
as well as for professional degrees. Special provisions are made for reli-
gious teachers both in the conditions of their employment and in their
treatment. 132 Proposed amendments to statutes governing the pontifical
schools require confirmation by the Holy See.' 3 3 Catholic University re-
ceives financial support from American Catholic congregations through
an annual collection at church services throughout the country.' The
University shares its campus with the National Shrine of the Immaculate
Conception, and its students, the majority of whom are Catholic, must
take theology and philosophy classes.'13  The University's mission state-
ments and goals consistently acknowledge its status as a Roman Catholic
institution, peculiarly attached to the national hierarchy and the
Vactican. 136
The Roman Catholic Bishops of the United States, under the leader-
ship of James Cardinal Gibbons, proposed the establishment of the Cath-
olic University of America in 1884. Pope Leo XIII approved the project
in 188713' and "canonically erected" the University in 1889.138 Due to
its pontifical nature, the University explicitly recognized the Apostolic
Constitution Deus Scientiarum Dominus, promulgated in 1931, and the
accompanying Ordinationes.139 When Pope John Paul II promulgated
the new Apostolic Constitution, Sapientia Christiana and its Ordina-
tiones, to take into account the teachings of Vatican II, the University
130. University Bylaws, supra note 10, § II, para. 1.
131. Id. § VII, para. 1.
132. Clerics and Religious: Supplementary Provisions, FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note
10, pt. III.
133. Special Statutesfor the Pontifical Schools, art. IX, FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note
10, pt. I, § 7, [hereinafter Special Statutes]. The Special Statutes were approved at the same
time as the University Bylaws and define the relationship to the Holy See of schools and de-
partments offering ecclesiastical studies. FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 10, pt. I, § 7, at 25.
134. Preface to the Bylaws, art. II, FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 10, pt. I, § 10.
135. 1986-1988 CATALOG OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA 72.
136. See Preface to the Bylaws, supra note 134; Goals of the Catholic University of America,
FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 10, pt. I, § 11.
137. FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 10, pt. I, § 2, at 4-7.
138. Letter from Pope Leo XIII, Magni nobis gaudi (Mar. 7, 1889), reprinted in FACULTY
HANDBOOK, supra note 10, pt. I, § 2, at 7-9. "Canonically erected" means established in ac-
cordance with and subject to the authority of Church law.
139. FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 10, pt I, § 1, at 3.
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adopted it in place of Deus Scientiarum Dominus to govern canonical
studies.'4°
In addition to its ecclesiastical status, the University has civil links
to the state. The University's Certificate of Incorporation, received in
1887, was amended by an Act of Congress in 1928.4 The Board of
Trustees elected to become a nonprofit corporation in 1964, converting
the University Statutes into Bylaws.' 4
2
This history underscores the continuous public understanding of the
University as specially connected to the institutional Church. It supports
the University's contention that Father Curran and all those profession-
ally associated with the pontifical schools have clear notice as to the ulti-
mate authority of the Roman Catholic hierarchy.
b. Charles Curran
Charles Curran freely joined the ministry and remains an ordained
cleric in the Church. Curran began his professional career teaching
moral theology to seminarians and, except for sabbaticals and visiting
professorships, has always taught moral theology at Catholic Univer-
sity.' 43 When he was hired to teach in the pontifically-created Depart-
ment of Theology at the University, the University followed the special
procedures required to make clerical appointments. These procedures
included obtaining permission for the appointment from Curran's bishop
and ensuring that he was granted a canonical mission." 4 The University
granted Curran tenure in the Department of Theology in 1971.
2. The Dispute
Ecclesiastical issues permeate the Curran controversy. The principal
actors named in the complaint-Curran, Hickey, and Byron-not only
share a common religion, but are priests with a clear understanding of
the polity of the Church. The University is a Roman Catholic institution
with particularly clear links to the American hierarchy. The controversy
results from the Vatican decision as to Curran's competence to teach in
the Department of Theology. In fact, the major point of debate concerns
the interpretation of the Canonical Statutes"'5 of the University. Each
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. The election is made under the District of Columbia Non-Profit Corporation Act,
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29.501-29.599.14 (1981 & Supp. 1987). FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra
note 10, pt. I, § 1, at 3, 10-16.
143. C. CURRAN, supra note 6, at 1-12.
144. See supra note I 1 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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party can be characterized as either religious or secular. The University
is both a nationally accredited institution of higher education incorpo-
rated under the laws of the District of Columbia and a Roman Catholic
establishment papally erected and actually controlled by the American
hierarchy. Similarly, Curran is both a tenured professor of moral theol-
ogy at a private university and a priest-theologian teaching in a canonical
faculty of the Roman Catholic Bishop's national center of higher learn-
ing. The dual character of each of the parties raises doubts as to whether
the controversy will be regarded as an intrachurch fight.
B. Judicial Analysis
A finding that the Curran case involves an intrachurch dispute does
not preclude a court from scrutinizing the suit. As long as the dispute
arises from civilly-based rather than ecclesiastically-based claims, the
court can still adjudicate the matter. It appears that Curran falls some-
where between Putman and Reardon. It is neither clearly an ecclesiasti-
cal nor strictly a civil employment issue. This hybrid posture makes a
judicial decision difficult. This Article predicts, however, that the court
will perceive the controversy as a dispute between a priest and his reli-
gious superiors over an interpretation of religiously based documents and
will therefore apply a Serbian strict deference analysis. On the other
hand, if the court views the issue as primarily a controversy over a secu-
lar teaching contract, couched in "legally cognizable language"-not fa-
tally pervaded with religious references-the court may employ a
Reardon approach, using neutral principles to resolve the conflict. This
section analyzes Curran under both approaches.46
Under the strict deference approach, the court's sole function is to
determine the proper church authority and then defer to it. As Univer-
sity Chancellor and representative of the Holy See, Hickey is empowered
to oversee the pontifical schools. Therefore, under this approach, the
court probably would defer to Hickey's judgment and permit the suspen-
sion and course cancellation without further inquiry.
146. A third possibility is that the court will refuse to review the case for fear of excessive
entanglement and lack of qualifications to decide the matter. See Protestant Episcopal Church
v. Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1981). Recently, courts have rejected
non-intervention in favor of either a strict deference or neutral principles analysis. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Wolf, 221 U.S. 595 (1979); Reardon v. Lemoyne, 122 N.H. 1042, 454 A.2d 428
(1982); see generally Note, supra note 91. Strict deference can be viewed as a Supreme Court-
approved method of resolving the civil dispute while at the same time avoiding these dangers.
The strict deference approach is arguably superior to the non-interventionist approach since it
gives the parties some, albeit limited, form of access to the courts.
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A neutral principles analysis requires a more thorough scrutiny of
the issues. The dispute centers on the scope of the Chancellor's power.
Curran's complaint deftly attempts to prove that only the president has
the authority to suspend him, and that the University did not follow
proper procedures for this action. 147 Byron, however, cancelled Curran's
classes only after Hickey suspended Curran. The cancellation followed
as a logical consequence of Hickey's decision not to permit Curran to
teach any courses in the Department of Theology. 4 Curran's charges
against Byron are predicated on his belief that Hickey's action consti-
tutes a breach of contract. Therefore, if the court applies neutral princi-
ples, it must tackle four questions. First, are the Canonical Statutes
binding on Curran even though they were adopted after he received ten-
ure? Second, do the Statutes violate Curran's academic freedom? Third,
what is the role and authority of the Chancellor? Finally, what interpre-
tation will the court accept on the scope of the Canonical Statutes and
the Chancellor's power?
1. Binding Character of the Canonical Statutes
Curran claims that the Canonical Statutes do not apply to him be-
cause the Statutes came into effect ten years after he accepted tenure in
1971.149 In 1982, when the Statutes were being adopted, Curran sent a
letter to the University stating that the Statutes did not apply to him
since his employment contract predated their adoption. 50 However, the
Board of Trustees approved the Bylaws in 1969. After the Holy See ap-
proved the statement of objectives, historical prefaces, and Bylaws, the
President of the University promulgated them in 1970.51 The Bylaws
contain several pertinent provisions concerning the pontifical schools, the
Faculty Handbook, and the amendment and revision process. The Uni-
versity may argue that before Curran accepted tenure, he had notice of
these authorizations and of the University's power to promulgate the Ca-
nonical Statutes according to set procedures by which he would be
bound.
In section II, paragraph 8 of the Bylaws, the Board of Trustees au-
thorizes the existence of pontifical schools and the creation of special
statutes for their governance in accordance with ecclesiastical require-
147. Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 14, at 15-16. See supra notes 14 & 16.
148. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 10, 14-16 and accompanying text.
150. Press Statement by Charles Curran (Aug. 20, 1986), reprinted in 16 ORIGINs 205, 206
(1986).
151. FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 10, pt. I, § 6, at 16.
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ments.152 The Special Statutes for Pontifical Schools ("Special Statutes")
were approved at the same time as the Bylaws.'53 Article III of the Spe-
cial Statutes allows the Board of Trustees to promulgate statutes and
regulations governing the Pontifical Schools154 and Article IX permits
revision or amendment of the Special Statutes by the Board of Trustees,
subject to confirmation by the Holy See.155 Additionally, section II, par-
agraph 9 of the Bylaws specifies that the Faculty Handbook, which is
required to contain a special chapter on the Faculty of the Pontifical
Schools, would have the same force as the Bylaws. 5 6 In accordance with
these provisions, the University adopted the Canonical Statutes in 1981
and revised them in 1984.157 Therefore, since the Bylaws promulgated
prior to Curran's tenure make clear the power and intention of the Board
of Trustees to create and amend statutes governing the Pontifical Schools
in accord with Vatican direction, doubt is cast on Curran's argument
that he is not subject to the Canonical Statutes.
2. Academic Freedom
Curran claims that application of the Canonical Statutes violates his
academic freedom by allowing Church powers to sanction him for exer-
cising his right to teach and write as he sees fit. 158 This contention, how-
ever, is weak. Catholic University is a private religious educational
center. The Supreme Court has never recognized a constitutional right
to academic freedom in a private, sectarian university.'59 In a private
152. The Board of Trustees does hereby authorize the existence and operation of Pon-
tifical Schools of the University. The Academic Senate, in consultation with the Fac-
ulties of these Schools, and observing appropriate ecclesiastical requirements, shall
adopt statutes for these Schools, which shall be subject to the approval of the Board
of Trustees in conformity with articles II and IV of the Special Statute for the Pontif-
ical Schools.
University Bylaws, supra note 10, § II, para. 8.
153. See supra note 133.
154. Special Statutes, supra note 133, art. III.
155. "The revision or amendment of these Statutes may be made by the Board of Trustees,
after consultation with the Academic Senate, and in accord with the Bylaws of the University.
Such revisions or amendments may be initiated either by the Board of Trustees or the Aca-
demic Senate. Before becoming effective, however, they require confirmation by the Holy
See." Id. art. IX.
156. University Bylaws, supra note 10, § II, para. 9.
157. See supra note 10.
158. Text of Fr. Curran's statement, Long Island Catholic, Aug. 28, 1986 at 8, col.I. In
this statement, Curran noted that the 1967 Land O'Lakes statement signed by the president of
Catholic University championed the right of Roman Catholic institutions of higher learning to
be free from lay or clerical control outside the academic community.
159. For the position that academic freedom should not be viewed as a constitutional right,
see R. KIRK, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: AN ESSAY IN DEFINITION 4-6 (1977); for the contrary
view, see O'Neil, Academic Freedom and the Constitution, 11 J. OF C. & U. L. 275 (1984).
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school, the contractual relationship defines the scope of academic free-
dom for tenured and non-tenured faculty.16° The University's Faculty
Handbook defines tenure as the right to continuous employment subject
to termination only under specified conditions and in accordance with
detailed procedures.161 The Handbook does not include academic free-
dom as a right associated with academic tenure. Yet, while there is no
grant of unrestricted academic freedom, tenure may only be revoked for
adequate reasons, such as cessation of ecclesiastical obligations 162 or for
cause. 163
It is likely that the court will look beyond the definition of tenure
and will examine the official publications of the University, its past prac-
tices with regard to academic freedom, and the common understanding
in the academic community.' 64 Curran may argue that the University
prides itself on freedom of scholarship and expression of ideas, and that
this is an explicit policy of the University. 165 The court must then decide
Although academic freedom is not recognized as a constitutional right, faculty, of course,
retain first amendment rights of free speech and association. An excellent discussion of the
historical evolution of tenure and academic freedom is contained in R. HOFSTADTER & W.
METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955).
For a discussion of the public-private dichotomy and the doctrine of state action, see W.
KAPLIN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 16-24 (1985). The leading case on the issue of
state action in private education is Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (no state
action when a private school received 99% of its funding from the state, followed specific state
regulations, and had a student body composed almost completely of public school students).
160. W. KAPLIN, supra note 159, at 24-27, 180.
161. "A tenured appointment is subject to termination only as set forth below, for cause
established and sustained by academic due process or for financial exigency." FACULTY
HANDBOOK, supra note 10, pt. II, § 3, art. 11.
162. "The University's contractual obligations will become void if the appointee resigns
from the priesthood without seeking laicization or is laicized under any canonical condition
that requires his resignation from the University." Id. pt. II, § 3, art. 23.
163. Id. pt. II, § 3, art. 24. Cause includes "demonstrable incompetence or dishonesty in
teaching or research, . . . manifest neglect of duty, or... other adequate cause." Id. It might
be argued that the Vatican's determination that Curran is unsuitable to teach Catholic theol-
ogy is tantamount to a state medical association's revocation of a doctor's medical license or a
state bar association disbarring an attorney. The University could contend that Curran is
"incompetent" and sever his tenure.
164. W. KAPLAN, supra note 159, at 91-93. See also Browzin v. Catholic University of
America, 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975), where the court looked to standards established by
the American Association of University Professors as indicia of the common practice of the
academic community in upholding the legitimacy of the University's dismissal of an engineer-
ing professor for financial exigency.
165. For example, the preface to the Bylaws states:
As a university, it is essentially a free and autonomous center of study and
agency serving the needs of human society. It welcomes the collaboration of all
scholars of goodwill who, through the process of study and reflection contribute to
these aims in an atmosphere of academic competence where freedom is fostered and
where the only constraint upon truth is truth itself.
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whether the Statutes impermissibly constrict the scope of academic free-
dom the University had previously allowed. First, the University might
contend that the Statutes do not infringe on academic freedom because
the Bylaws, which predate Curran's tenure and merely codify historic
practice, authorize their creation.166 The Faculty Handbook makes clear
that ecclesiastical norms govern in ecclesiastical matters; for example,
the Handbook stipulates that, as a condition of employment, priests re-
tain primary obligations to ecclesiastical superiors and must observe Ca-
non Law and all directives of the Holy See and the National Conference
of Catholic Bishops.' 67 Arguably, this provision of the Handbook re-
stricted the parameters of academic freedom before Curran's tenure.
The University may further contend that rather than infringing on
academic freedom, the Statutes actually grant greater protection to
teachers by establishing procedures which the University must follow
before imposing sanctions.'68 This codification imposes limits on the
University's power to retaliate against a faculty member. In light of the
fact that the statutory procedural safeguards appear to provide greater
academic freedom than existed before their adoption, Curran's charge
that the Statutes violate his academic freedom is less persuasive. In addi-
tion, Curran is well-versed in institutional practice and the policies of the
Holy See. Thus, his claim to extensive academic freedom appears uncon-
vincing in an educational atmosphere heavily influenced by the Univer-
sity's long-standing observation of normative declarations of the Holy
See.
Moreover, if the court examines the Statutes to determine whether
they infringe on academic freedom, it may run into religious determina-
tions forbidden by Blue Hull Church. Since the Statutes specifically refer
to documents of the Second Vatican Council, papal pronouncements,
Preface to the Bylaws, supra note 134, art. I.
166. See supra note 152.
167. In issuing an appointment to a cleric of the Roman Catholic Church, the Univer-
sity recognizes not only the professional qualifications of the appointee but also the
public effects of the appointee's status as an ordained priest, which includes primary
obligations to ecclesiastical superiors and observance of the provisions of canon law
and all directives of the Holy See and the National conference of Catholic Bishops.
Faculty Handbook, supra note 10, pt. II, § 4, art. 23.
168. The Canonical Statutes, while according the Chancellor wide latitude in ecclesiastical
matters, establishes various steps or requirements to force the Chancellor to take into account
a variety of opinions and not to move too quickly, except in grave emergencies. Checks on the
Chancellor's powers include required consultation with the episcopal trustees, the University
President, and pertinent faculty committees before denying a canonical mission. Canonical
Statutes, supra note 10, pt. I, § V, para. 4. Similarly, the process for suspension and termina-
tion has required steps which include mandatory consultations and gives the faculty member
in question the right to invoke procedures specified in the Faculty Handbook. Id. pt. I, § V,
paras. 7-9. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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and church directives,' 69 an evaluation of the impact of the Statutes on
the scope of academic freedom would raise serious Blue Hull Church
problems. In order to decide what level of academic freedom the Univer-
sity has granted to its faculty, the court must determine what academic
freedom means in the Catholic system of higher learning, and particu-
larly within the theology department of Catholic University. This deter-
mination would require examining church documents incorporated into
the Bylaws and Statutes to see what definitions and parameters have been
established. The religious origin, language, and purpose of the docu-
ments seem to preclude judicial consideration of this evidence and testi-
mony from experts on Catholic education would occasion the same Blue
Hull Church problems.
3. Role of the Chancellor
Since Hickey claims to have acted in his capacity as Chancellor
when he suspended Curran, the court must determine what the powers of
the Chancellor are. Section VII of the Bylaws states that the Archbishop
of Washington is ex officio Chancellor of the University and serves "as a
liason between the University and the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops, as well as between the University and the Holy See." 170 Section
13 of the Faculty Handbook further describes the Chancellor's role:
"His rights and duties with respect to the Schools and Departments of-
fering ecclesiastical studies and degrees are based upon the Apostolic
Constitution Sapientia Christiana and the accompanying Norms of
Application."' 1
The Canonical Statutes incorporate Sapientia Christiana, its Ordina-
tiones, the decisions of the Second Vatican Council affecting higher edu-
cation, and canons 815 to 821 of the Code of Canon Law governing
Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties.172 The Statutes expressly ac-
knowledge the authority of the Holy See to determine the standards for
administering the pontifical schools. 173 The Statutes elaborate on the
Chancellor's duties, which include the duty to "promote the progress of
169. See supra note 10.
170. University Bylaws, supra note 10, § VIII, paras. 1, 2. See also FACULTY HANDBOOK,
supra note 10, pt. I, § 13, at 37.
171. FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 10, pt. I, § 13, at 37.
172. See supra note 10. Additionally, the Statutes accept all declarations of the Holy See
which are not specified in the Statutes. "Norms affecting ecclesiastical faculties which are
found in the ecclesiastical legislation of the Second Vatican Council or the Apostolic See are
not repeated in these Statutes." Canonical Statutes, supra note 10, § I, para. 8.
173. One example of this is found in Canonical Statutes, supra note 10, pt. I, § V, para. I 1
(emphasis in original): "These norms and practices concerning appointments to the Faculties
are intended to assure fidelity to the revealing Word of God as it is transmitted by tradition
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the Faculties, in themselves and in relation to the other Schools of the
University, to advance learning and scholarship, and to see that Catholic
doctrine is integrally taught and that the statutes and ecclesiastical
norms are implemented." '174 The Chancellor is also charged to "protect
the doctrine and discipline of the Church" in collaboration with the
University. 75
Since the Department of Theology was established as a church-ap-
proved center of Catholic theological studies, the Chancellor must certify
that each faculty member is qualified to teach Catholic theology. The
Church requires that every person appointed to a pontifical faculty must
receive a "canonical mission to teach in the name of the Church," 176 if he
or she teaches disciplines pertaining to faith or morals. The requirement
can be viewed as a matter of "truth-in-advertising." The University
holds out the department as a Church-certified institution for Catholic
religious studies. The Chancellor must ensure that what is taught accu-
rately reflects Catholic teaching as defined by the certifying authority,
the Magisterium.
In limited circumstances the Chancellor is also empowered to with-
draw the canonical mission. 177 He may suspend the faculty member dur-
ing withdrawal proceedings in "more serious and pressing cases," using
certain special procedures. 178
4. Interpretation of the Canonical Statutes
Assuming that the Chancellor had the power to suspend Curran, the
court could apply neutral principles to examine the Chancellor's actions
to see if they complied with the procedures set forth for suspension. Cur-
ran, however, does not contend that Hickey failed to follow the required
procedural steps. 17  Rather, Curran disagrees with Hickey's determina-
tion that the matter is a "more serious or pressing" case warranting sus-
and interpreted and safeguarded by the magisterium of the Church and to safeguard academic
freedom."
174. Id. pt. I, § III, para. 7(a).
175. Id. pt. I, § III, para. 7(g).
176. Id. pt. I, § V, para. 4.
177. "After the grant of the canonical mission of permission to teach, the Chancellor may
withdraw the mission or permission only for the most serious reasons and after providing
information regarding specific charges and proofs." Id. pt I, § V, para. 8.1. The statutes also
provide that the Chancellor may suspend a member of the ecclesiastical faculty in an emer-
gency when the member's continued employment threatens himself or others. Id. pt. I, § V,
para. 10.
178. Id. pt. I, § V, para. 9.
179. Nowhere does Curran claim Hickey did not follow set procedures. In fact, Curran
relates Hickey's compliance and the results of his consultations in a press statement. The
Canonical Statutes provide that the Chancellor must explain his reasons tbr suspension and
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pension. Curran also rejects Hickey's interpretation that the Chancellor,
under the Canonical Statutes and Bylaws, exercises authority over the
entire Department of Theology.
It seems doubtful that the court will substitute its own interpretation
of what is a "more serious or pressing" case for that of the Chancellor.
As long as Hickey followed the procedures set forth in the Bylaws, the
court no doubt will defer to the Chancellor's decision as to the serious-
ness of the matter, which is essentially a religious issue. Furthermore,
inquiring into the reasonableness of Hickey's determination would force
the court to decide the value of the Vatican declaration regarding Cur-
ran's ability to teach Catholic theology.
More problematic, however, is Curran's argument concerning the
limits of the Canonical Statutes. As discussed in Section I, the crux of
the dispute centers on whether the Canonical Statutes and the Chancel-
lor may govern those who teach in non-canonical degree granting pro-
grams within the Department of Theology.18 ° Curran claims that the
plain wording of the Canonical Statutes indicates that they apply only to
those teaching ecclesiastical degree courses. Curran teaches courses
which satisfy the civil as well as canonical degree requirements, and he
contends that the Chancellor's power does not extend to his civil degree
classes. 18 1
On the other hand, Hickey notes that Curran holds tenure subject to
the norms of the Holy See and observes that although "there are non-
ecclesiastical programs in the Department of Theology, . . . there are no
non-ecclesiastical teachers." 1 2 The Chancellor may defend his interpre-
tation by noting that as a condition of employment, Curran was granted
a canonical mission by the Church. He voluntarily accepted tenure with
full knowledge of the long-standing special relationship of the depart-
ment to the Holy See, the historic practice of obedience to the directives
of the Vatican, and the traditional exercise of power by the Chancellor
over the entire department. Furthermore, the department emphasizes its
commitment to the institutional Church in providing a center for Catho-
lic studies and professional training for Catholic ministry.18 3
seek the advice of the University President, Dean, and Department Chairman, as well as that
of the professor concerned.
Id. pt. I, § V, para. 9.3. The Chancellor complied with these requirements on Dec. 19,
1986. Press Statement of Charles Curran (Jan. 12, 1987), reprinted in 16 ORIGINS 574 (1987).
180. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
181. Id.
182. Letter from Hickey to Curran (Jan. 13, 1987), reprinted in 16 ORIGINs 591 (1987).
183. In keeping with the aims of the The Catholic University of America, the Depart-
ment of Theology seeks to serve the Christian community and the American public
by providing academic and ministerial programs rooted in the Catholic-Christian
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Nevertheless, the court might follow Reardon and treat the issue as
strictly one of contract interpretation, which does not require examina-
tion of religious matters.184 The Faculty Handbook and the Canonical
Statutes contain language supporting both Curran's and Hickey's inter-
pretation.18 Some form of distinction exists between the civil and eccle-
siastical degree programs and the canonically-recognized course of study
expressly governed by the Statutes. 86 The issue revolves around
whether the distinction affects the status of the faculty members teaching
those classes.
The court could plausibly read the Statutes as assuming an essential
distinction between the ecclesiastical and civil programs and then extend
this distinction to the teachers themselves. After deciding that the Stat-
utes deal only with the ecclesiastical degrees and that the faculty wear
both pontifical and civil hats, the court might determine that the Chan-
cellor's power is limited to issues involving matters affecting the canoni-
cal degree program alone. Under this reasoning, Hickey's suspension of
Curran would be valid only as to those courses within the canonical por-
tion of the program. Curran's three classes satisfied both civil and ca-
nonical requirements. If a course may count for credit under both
programs, is it deemed civil or canonical? Rather than adopt an inter-
pretation which contradicts the Chancellor's decision on a close question,
the court will likely accept Hickey's judgment.
tradition and experience. It is committed to Catholic teaching, found in Scripture
and Tradition and served by the living Magisterium in its faithful and authentic in-
terpretation. In order to fulfill this responsibility, the Department of Theology has as
its twofold purpose: (1) the pursuit of graduate theological study and research in the
Roman Catholic tradition and (2) the professional training for the ministry in the
Roman Catholic Church.
Canonical Statutes, supra note 10, pt. IV, § I, para. 1.
184. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
185. The court might even apply contra proferentem analysis and construe the provisions in
favor of the non-drafting party to find in Curran's favor. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 499
(1982).
186. In support of the different interpretations of the Preamble to the Canonical Statutes,
see Special Statutes, supra note 134, art. II ("These Schools are called Pontifical by virtue of
accreditation by the Holy See; consequently those courses, programs, and degrees having ca-
nonical effects shall be conducted according to norms and regulations promulgated by the
Holy See."); see also id. art. IV ("These academic policies shall conform to the accepted stan-
dards of the American academic community. Those programs having canonical effects shall, as
noted, conform to the norms established by the Holy See."); Canonical Statutes, supra note 10,
pt. IV, § I, para. 3 ("In accord with its two fold purpose, the Department offers several differ-
ent degree programs as well as a wide variety of courses so that students will have the opportu-
nity to develop theologically in view of their personal goals. Of these programs, [some) are
ecclesiastical or pontifical in nature and are governed by these Statutes."); id. pt VI, § I, para. 5
("The ecclesiastical degree programs of the Department, besides being subject to the approval
of the Holy See, are subject to accreditation by the Association of Theological Schools." (em-
phasis in original)).
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5. Probable Judicial Result
Finally, the analysis returns to the initial and most important ques-
tion of whether Curran constitutes an internal church controversy over a
matter sufficiently imbued with religious elements to trigger strict defer-
ence rather than neutral principles analysis. Although the court might
refuse to regard the case as an intrachurch dispute, such a characteriza-
tion seems difficult to justify because of the nature of the parties, the
history and context of the dispute, and the language of the documents.
Regardless of whether the court applies strict deference, neutral princi-
ples, or straight contract law, the outcome should be the same. Essen-
tially there is no distinction between neutral principles and straight
contract law because under either, Blue Hull Church prohibits the court
from construing religious terms. 8 7
If the court views the issue of the Chancellor's power to suspend as
turning on the interpretation of religious-based issues and writings, it
either will invoke the doctrine of strict deference to accept the Chancel-
lor's decision or will comply with the ban on religious inquiry, which
would lead to the same result. Blue Hull Church prevents the court from
delving into the controlling documents sufficiently to resolve the dispute
over interpretation. In addition to the Canonical Statutes which incorpo-
rate by reference the ecclesiastical authority of the Vatican, the Faculty
Handbook expressly notes that the University requires ordained clerics
to observe their obligations to ecclesiastical superiors, the provisions of
the Code of Canon Law, and the directives of the Holy See and Ameri-
can Bishops' Conference. 8 8 The Faculty Handbook and Canonical Stat-
utes recognize the Chancellor as the chief representative of the Church in
the University. 189 He is charged with ensuring that the directives of the
Holy See are faithfully followed. 9 ' Under a Kedroff/Serbian rationale,
this duty includes the power to determine what those directives mean.' 9 '
Hickey's determination that he has the power to suspend Curran appears
reasonable in light of these provisions, the nature of the controversy, and
the relationship of the parties.
The Seventh Circuit's recent rulings in cases regarding hiring in two
Jesuit universities support the proposition that the Chancellor, as repre-
sentative of the Bishops and the Holy See, has authority over Curran's
187. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 170-177 and accompanying text.
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 42-47, 64-72 and accompanying text; see also itfra note 196 and ac-
companying text.
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teaching in the Department of Theology.192 Pime v. Loyola University of
Chicago '93 and Maguire v. Marquette University'94 illustrate at least one
circuit's willingness to give Roman Catholic universities broad discretion
to restrict access to teaching positions to those who share a particular
religious outlook. The opinions suggest the Seventh Circuit's strong
sympathy with the right of sectarian institutions to ensure that their
faculty impart doctrine consistent with their religious mission. The court
in Curran could follow similar sympathies. Employing neutral contract
principles, the court may read University documents as specifying that
the Chancellor is empowered to decide matters of interpretation concern-
ing the pontifical schools. 195 Under this approach, the court would find
192. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
193. 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986). In Pime, the Seventh Circuit found that Loyola had not
impermissibly discriminated against a Jewish applicant for a tenure track position in the phi-
losophy department. The faculty, concerned with the dwindling Jesuit presence within the
department, resolved that seven positions would be reserved for Jesuit philosophers. Although
no hint of invidious discrimination was present, the court assumed "that because Pime's faith
would prevent his being a Jesuit, he has a claim of discrimination on account of religion." Id.
at 353. The court found that requiring a certain number of teachers to be Jesuits fell within the
bona fide occupational qualification exemption (BFOQ) to Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1984), and upheld the importance of Loyola's ability to protect its Jesuit
presence by controlling who taught in the philosophy department.
The BFOQ involved in this case is membership in a religious order of a particu-
lar faith. There is evidence of the relationship of the order to Loyola, and that Jesuit
'presence' is important to the successful operation of the university. It appears signif-
icant to the tradition and character of the institution that students be assured a de-
gree of contact with teachers who have received the training and accepted the
obligations which are essential to membership in the Society of Jesus. It requires
more to be Jesuit than adherence to the Catholic faith, and it seems wholly reason-
able to believe that the educational experience at Loyola would be different if Jesuit
presence were not maintained.
803 F.2d at 353-54.
Judge Posner, concurring, rejected the contention that Loyola had discriminated at all
against Pime on account of his religion. Pime was turned down "not because he is a Jew, not
because he is not a Catholic, but because he is not a member of the Jesuit order." Id. at 354
(Posner, J., concurring).
194. No. 86-1412 slip op. (7th Cir. Mar. 20, 1987) (available on LEXIS). In Maguire, the
Seventh Circuit ruled that Marquette University did not discriminate on the basis of gender in
refusing to hire a female professor for a teaching position in the theology department. In
rejecting Maguire's claim that her sex was a substantial motivating factor in her denial of a job,
the court found that the University validly could have refused to hire her-even if she had
otherwise been competent-based on her position on abortion and a "perceived hostility to the
institutional church and its teachings." Id. The court indicated its approval of the Jesuit
school's prerogative to screen out those applicants who disagree with the school's Roman
Catholic view point. Additionally, the court upheld the policy of preferential hiring for
Jesuits, particularly in the theology department, where the courses "are taught in the perspec-
tive of the Roman Catholic tradition and do emphasize the religious and intitutional values of
that tradition." Id.
195. The court might also view the complaint as prematurely brought. Curran has not
exhausted his appeals within the university or within the Church. The court might dismiss the
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that the University deferred to the Chancellor's authoritative ruling, rec-
ognized his suspension of Curran, and cancelled the classes as a result of
the suspension. The court would thereby enforce the decision of the con-
tractually "stipulated" tribunal, the Chancellor, even though he is defin-
ing the extent of his own authority.' 96 It is doubtful that the court would
review the reasonableness of this determination for, in doing so, the court
would have to skirt Serbian's disavowal of the arbitrariness exception. 97
If the court finds that Curran is an intrachurch dispute-a legal con-
flict between the Archbishop/Chancellor and a priest/professor who has
been judged by his self-acknowledged superiors as neither suitable nor
eligible to exercise the function of a professor of Catholic theology-it
could apply strict deference, especially in light of the fully hierarchical
nature of the Roman Catholic Church. Under such an analysis, the
court would note that minimal inquiry reveals that the Chancellor is the
Church authority charged with the special responsibility to protect the
doctrines and disciplines of the Church within the pontifical schools.
Consequently, Hickey's judgment would be enforced. If the court em-
ployed neutral principles, the Blue Hull Church strictures on what evi-
dence may be considered severely limits the issues the court may
consider in this case. Deciding that the Chancellor's interpretation is
incorrect would probably require too searching an inquiry. Therefore,
the judicial result-upholding the University's actions-should be the
same whether the court applies strict deference or adopts a neutral prin-
ciples analysis.
Conclusion
Curran's suit presents an unusual case for the Church and the
American legal system precisely because it does not fit neatly into either
the ecclesiastical or civil law. Curran opposes his suspension, but he does
so in his capacity as a university professor challenging the action of the
Chancellor. In turn, Hickey is exercising his power as Chancellor, not
his religious authority as Archbishop. However, the contours of the
civilly recognized power of the Chancellor are defined by Church docu-
ments and Catholic principles which overlap with his religious authority.
suit until Curran has attempted these avenues. In response to Curran's charge that harm has
already occurred and continues to occur due to the alleged breach of contract, the court could
note that the damages may be assessed cumulatively after the appeals are exhausted and if a
breach is found.
196. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733-34 (1871); Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976).
197. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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Curran pits two fundamental principles against each other: the
right of religious free exercise and the right to judicial review of contrac-
tual agreements. The case raises the issue of the place of theological dis-
sent within the Roman Catholic Church. Curran has invoked the
apparatus of the state in his fight to force Church toleration of positions
on moral questions that are incompatible with the teachings of the Mag-
isterium. Presenting the dispute to the court as a matter of contractual
interpretation does not veil the true nature of what is at stake. Curran
represents the recurring conflict over religious power: who determines
what is Roman Catholic theology and who may teach that theology.
Rather than scrutinizing the religiously-based documents and the prac-
tices of the University, the court would be wise to leave this quintessen-
tially religious matter for resolution within the Church. Caesar's tribunal
is no place for internal Roman Catholic disputes; it is imprudent for the
state and dangerous for the Church.
